The influence relation for ternary voting games
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Recommendations
- Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories
- Ternary voting games
- On the ordinal equivalence of the Jonhston, Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention
- Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention
- A special case of Penrose's limit theorem when abstention is allowed
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1470897 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1357433 (Why is no real title available?)
- A class of simple games
- Achievable hierarchies in voting games
- Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
- Can an asymmetric power structure always be achieved?
- Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters
- Complete simple games
- On ordinal equivalence of power measures given by regular semivalues
- On ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for cooperative games
- Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games
- Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
- Simple majority achievable hierarchies
- Stability of decision systems under majority rule
- Ternary voting games
- Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories
- Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
Cited in
(16)- Influence relation in two-output multichoice voting games
- Axiomatization of some power indices in voting games with abstention
- Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories
- Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention
- Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
- The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games
- On the ordinal equivalence of the Jonhston, Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention
- Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
- A note on the ordinal equivalence of power indices in games with coalition structure
- Round-robin political tournaments: abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power
- All power structures are achievable in basic weighted games
- Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output
- Abstentions in the German Bundesrat and ternary decision rules in weighted voting systems
- Properties of ladder tournaments
- Early warning indicators of epidemics on a coupled behaviour-disease model with vaccine hesitance and incomplete data
- A critical analysis on the notion of power
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