On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings

DOI10.1007/PL00013699zbMath0986.91033OpenAlexW2016143012MaRDI QIDQ5944742

Ahmet U. Alkan

Publication date: 10 October 2001

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00013699

zbMATH Keywords

latticechoice functionrevealed preferencestable matchings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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