Normalized range voting broadly resists control

DOI10.1007/s00224-012-9441-0zbMath1386.91063arXiv1005.5698OpenAlexW1568163646MaRDI QIDQ385502

Curtis Menton

Publication date: 2 December 2013

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1005.5698

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexitycomputational social choiceelectoral controlrange voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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