Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.017zbMath1296.91027OpenAlexW3122868545MaRDI QIDQ405534

Takuo Sugaya, Satoru Takahashi

Publication date: 5 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.017

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessrepeated gameglobal gamealmost-public monitoringbelief-free equilibriumprivate monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents, Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring, Instability of belief-free equilibria, Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal, Dynamic network formation with foresighted agents

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