Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods
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Publication:532728
DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0200-7zbMath1211.91154MaRDI QIDQ532728
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0200-7
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
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