Locally robust implementation and its limits

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.012zbMath1276.91080OpenAlexW2132105654MaRDI QIDQ694745

Benny Moldovanu, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Philippe Jehiel

Publication date: 13 December 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.012

zbMATH Keywords

ex-post implementationbilinear value functionlocally robust implementationquasi-linear Bernoulli utility functionregular allocation function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Individual preferences (91B08) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Social choice (91B14) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Related Items

Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms, Continuous virtual implementation: complete information, Locally robust contracts for moral hazard, Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design, Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge, Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction

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