Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
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Publication:700125
DOI10.1006/game.2001.0891zbMath1021.91005OpenAlexW2160313032MaRDI QIDQ700125
Publication date: 30 September 2002
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/1525.pdf
Related Items (10)
The evolution of parental investment: re-examining the anisogamy argument ⋮ How robust is the equal split norm? Responsive strategies, selection mechanisms and the need for economic interpretation of simulation parameters ⋮ A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment. ⋮ Property rights and investments: an evolutionary approach ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences ⋮ Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms ⋮ Evolution in finitely repeated coordination games ⋮ Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach ⋮ Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time
Cites Work
- A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
- Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit
- Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games
- Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model
- An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
- Stochastic stability in games with alternative best replies
- An evolutionary model of bargaining
- Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Conventional Contracts
- Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
- Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
- Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
- The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
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