Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
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Publication:866929
DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0152-9zbMATH Open1134.91353OpenAlexW2133667021MaRDI QIDQ866929FDOQ866929
Arunava Sen, Bhaskar Dutta, Hans Peters
Publication date: 14 February 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269616/files/twerp722.pdf
Cites Work
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- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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- Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
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- Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
- Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
- Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
- A geometric proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem
- An alternative proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship result
Cited In (20)
- Social Choice Theory
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
- Efficient compromising
- Cardinal admissibility and optimability in finite nonarchimedean decision theory
- Fair sharing under dichotomous preferences
- What proportion of sincere voters guarantees efficiency?
- The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences
- Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
- Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes
- Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains
- Truthful ownership transfer with expert advice
- Random assignments and outside options
- Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Inefficiencies on linking decisions
- The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences
- Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes. Erratum to: Soc Choice Welfare 28, 163--179 (2007; Zbl pre05126669).
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