Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions

From MaRDI portal
Revision as of 15:19, 30 January 2024 by Import240129110113 (talk | contribs) (Created automatically from import240129110113)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)

Publication:864895

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.12.004zbMath1154.91419OpenAlexW2071854262MaRDI QIDQ864895

Lixin Ye

Publication date: 13 February 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.004




Related Items (28)

Auctions with entry and resaleA pre-emption model of mergersPre-play communication in procurement auctions: silence is not goldenAuctions with selective entryGender effects in private value auctionsDual sourcing with price discoveryProcurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebatesI want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctionsA class of two-stage distributionally robust gamesTwo results on auctions with endogenous entryEfficient investment in a dynamic auction environmentSequential information disclosure in auctionsIndicative bidding: An experimental analysisAuction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covertOn the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosureWhat model for entry in first-price auctions? A nonparametric approachInference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entryEfficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivalsOPTIMAL TIMING AND EQUILIBRIUM PRICE FOR SOE PROPERTY RIGHTS TRANSFER UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATIONEmpirical relevance of ambiguity in first-price auctionsIdentification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneityInformation acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bidsAUCTION–LOTTERY HYBRID MECHANISMS: STRUCTURAL MODEL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSISOptimal auctions with information acquisitionA sequential auction-bargaining procurement modelCostly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designsRisky procurement with an insider bidderPre-contest communication incentives




Cites Work




This page was built for publication: Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions