Endogenous budget constraints in auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.03.010zbMath1330.91091OpenAlexW1991710782MaRDI QIDQ896934

Justin Burkett

Publication date: 15 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.010

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsbudget constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (10)

Auctions vs. fixed pricing: competing for budget constrained buyers ⋮ Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets ⋮ Endogenous budget constraints ⋮ Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents ⋮ Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility ⋮ Post-auction investment by financially constrained bidders ⋮ Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences ⋮ The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints ⋮ A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions ⋮ Wars of attrition with endogenously determined budget constraints

Cites Work

• A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints
• Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders
• Classes of orderings of measures and related correlation inequalities. I. Multivariate totally positive distributions
• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
• On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
• Credit contracting and bidding under wealth constraints.
• Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case
• Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• High bids and broke winners

This page was built for publication: Endogenous budget constraints in auctions