The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n- person noncooperative games

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Publication:1223026

DOI10.1007/BF01766187zbMath0319.90078MaRDI QIDQ1223026

John C. Harsanyi

Publication date: 1975

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)




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