Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: equality without symmetry

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.05.002zbMath1400.91024OpenAlexW2521602818WikidataQ129779768 ScholiaQ129779768MaRDI QIDQ1651241

Sung-Ha Hwang, Wooyoung Lim, Jonathan Newton, Philip R. Neary

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://econ-wpseries.com/2016/201613.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionegalitarianismNash programlogit choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (15)

Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes ⋮ Competing conventions with costly information acquisition ⋮ Deep and shallow thinking in the long run ⋮ Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under probit choice ⋮ Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching ⋮ Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems ⋮ Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games ⋮ Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule ⋮ Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run ⋮ Social coordination with locally observable types ⋮ Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability ⋮ A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games ⋮ Imitation and local interactions: long run equilibrium selection

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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