Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game
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Publication:1680118
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.09.001zbMath1415.91083OpenAlexW2527964515WikidataQ56609433 ScholiaQ56609433MaRDI QIDQ1680118
Rosemarie Nagel, Christoph Bühren, Björn Frank
Publication date: 22 November 2017
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://econ-papers.upf.edu/papers/1539.pdf
Related Items (4)
Asymmetric guessing games ⋮ The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games ⋮ A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly ⋮ Experimental cheap talk games: strategic complementarity and coordination
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