Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption

DOI10.1007/BF00182193zbMATH Open0834.90011OpenAlexW1974024402MaRDI QIDQ1804570FDOQ1804570

Roger B. Myerson

Publication date: 15 May 1995

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00182193

zbMATH Keywords

scoring rulereinforcementneutralityoverwhelming majorities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cited In (36)

• Weighted majoritarian rules for the location of multiple public facilities
• On stable rules for selecting committees
• Voting rules as statistical estimators
• Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
• Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules
• Bivariate scoring rules: unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule
• Scoring rules for judgment aggregation
• Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of approval voting
• The Borda class. An axiomatic study of the Borda rule on top-truncated preferences
• An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
• Revealed votes
• The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
• Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
• Characteristic properties of list proportional representation systems
• Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting
• Axioms for Euclidean preferences with a valence dimension
• The median rule in judgement aggregation
• Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
• Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences
• Formal utilitarianism and range voting
• Size approval voting
• Utility in case-based decision theory
• Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
• Weighted scoring committees
• Towards a theory of MCDM: Stepping away from social choice theory
• Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity
• Categorization generated by extended prototypes -- an axiomatic approach
• Utilitarianism without individual utilities
• An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium
• Act similarity in case-based decision theory
• A characterization of the rational mean neat voting rules
• Rational status quo
• Rank-based choice correspondences
• Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
• Variable-population voting rules
• A general scoring rule

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