Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets

DOI10.1007/s00182-020-00741-1zbMath1461.91201OpenAlexW2950347886MaRDI QIDQ2021788

Antonio Romero-Medina, Matteo Triossi

Publication date: 27 April 2021

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00741-1

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityacyclicitystrategy-proofnessmany-to-many

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (2)

Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence ⋮ Unique stable matchings

Cites Work

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