Promises and endogenous reneging costs

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105024zbMath1437.91100OpenAlexW2610825160MaRDI QIDQ2173104

Yuval Heller, David Sturrock

Publication date: 22 April 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/78803/2/MPRA_paper_78803.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

promisesstrategic complementslying costsinput gamespartnership games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

Communication with endogenous deception costs

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