Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games

DOI10.1007/s00355-019-01180-yzbMath1425.91039MaRDI QIDQ2325653

Yukihiko Funaki, Takumi Kongo, Koji Yokote

Publication date: 27 September 2019

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01180-y

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley value; TU games; set of affine combinations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

Related Items

Weakly balanced contributions and the weighted Shapley values, Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values, Impacts of boycotts concerning the Shapley value and extensions

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