Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.02.008zbMath1314.91183arXiv1302.3546OpenAlexW2100165388WikidataQ47907580 ScholiaQ47907580MaRDI QIDQ2351098

Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc

Publication date: 23 June 2015

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1302.3546

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsstructured populationspunishmentconditional strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites Work

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• Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation
• Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
• Selection pressure transforms the nature of social dilemmas in adaptive networks

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