On the epistemic foundation for iterated weak dominance: an analysis in a logic of individual and collective attitudes

DOI10.1007/s10992-013-9297-zzbMath1286.03047OpenAlexW2042065436MaRDI QIDQ2441476

Emiliano Lorini

Publication date: 24 March 2014

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-013-9297-z

zbMATH Keywords

belief revisionepistemic logicepistemic game theoryiterated weak dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91A99) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Related Items (2)

A minimal logic for interactive epistemology ⋮ Epistemic logic meets epistemic game theory: a comparison between multi-agent Kripke models and type spaces

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