Coalitional desirability and the equal division value
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Publication:2633438
DOI10.1007/s11238-018-9672-xzbMath1411.91037OpenAlexW2739470375MaRDI QIDQ2633438
Philippe Solal, Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila
Publication date: 8 May 2019
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2017-08.pdf
desirabilityShapley valueequal division valuecoalitional desirabilityaverage coalitional desirabilityuniform coalitional desirability
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