A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching

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Publication:3201772


DOI10.1016/0196-6774(91)90028-WzbMath0715.68069MaRDI QIDQ3201772

Jimmy J. M. Tan

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Journal of Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0196-6774(91)90028-w


68Q25: Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity

68R05: Combinatorics in computer science

68W10: Parallel algorithms in computer science


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