A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*

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Publication:3401193


DOI10.1162/qjec.121.4.1133zbMath1179.91059MaRDI QIDQ3401193

Matthew Rabin, Botond Kőszegi

Publication date: 29 January 2010

Published in: Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0w82b6nm


91B08: Individual preferences


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