Characterization of Revenue Equivalence

DOI10.3982/ECTA7168zbMath1160.91343MaRDI QIDQ3627285

Rudolf Müller, Birgit Heydenreich, Marc Uetz, Rakesh V. Vohra

Publication date: 18 May 2009

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designincentive compatibilityrevenue equivalence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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