Informational Equilibrium
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Publication:3863633
DOI10.2307/1914187zbMath0426.90004OpenAlexW4245156943MaRDI QIDQ3863633
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp071.pdf
economics of informationnon-cooperative equilibrium conceptinformational equilibriumdifferent product qualitiesmarket with incomplete information
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