Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach

DOI10.1287/OPRE.2018.1720zbMath1455.91135OpenAlexW2883470513WikidataQ129454900 ScholiaQ129454900MaRDI QIDQ4971397

Christopher Thomas Ryan, Rongzhu Ke

Publication date: 12 October 2020

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/346f85655b08a868d56f4688d73c4ac634e78fc0

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityoptimality conditionsmoral hazard problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Related Items (3)

Carbon pricing initiatives-based bi-level pollution routing problem ⋮ The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems ⋮ A general solution method for moral hazard problems

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