Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2009.05.008MaRDI QIDQ845010zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Debasis Mishra, Dolf Talman

Publication date 5 February 2010

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/3e249b02-c0f4-4ccf-bd37-f9e693fb7ad8

zbMATH Keywords

Walrasian equilibriumiterative auctionsassignment modeloverdemanded setunderdemanded set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1768785 (Why is no real title available?)
• Characterization of cores of assignment games
• Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy
• Incentives in Teams
• Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
• Maximum-Minimum Sätze über Graphen
• Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
• On Representatives of Subsets
• On a dynamic auction mechanism for a bilateral assignment problem
• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• The English auction with differentiated commodities
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The extremal length of a network
• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes

Cited in

(23)

• A graph theoretic approach to markets for indivisible goods
• Core and Walrasian equilibria when agents' characteristics are extremely dispersed
• A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule
• The nonatomic assignment model
• Sensitivity of fair prices in assignment markets
• An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium
• A characterization of equilibria in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism
• The structure of competitive equilibria in an assignment market
• Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction
• Assignment models for constrained marginals and restricted markets
• Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders
• Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule
• Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model
• A speedy auction using approximated bidders' preferences
• A competitive partnership formation process
• Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: leading examples
• Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions
• Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games
• An assignment model with local constraints: competitive equilibrium and ascending auction
• Comparative statics of assignment markets with general utilities
• How to efficiently allocate houses under price controls?
• The discrete separation theorem and price adjustment directions in markets with heterogeneous commodities

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