On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
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Cited in
(62)- Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks
- Subjective random discounting and intertemporal choice
- Communication, commitment, and growth
- On the long run implications of repeated moral hazard
- Stock-returns and inflation in a principal-agent economy
- Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model
- Optimal policy in a model of endogenous fluctuations and assets
- Non-existence of recursive equilibria on compact state spaces when markets are incomplete.
- A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence
- Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information
- Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment
- Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality
- Investment and bilateral insurance
- Optimal government policies in models with heterogeneous agents
- Smoothing sudden stops
- On Ramsey's conjecture: efficient allocations in the neoclassical growth model with private information
- Default and efficient debt markets.
- A dynamic theory of war and peace
- Optimal lending contracts with long run borrowing constraints
- Optimal self-financing microfinance contracts when borrowers have risk aversion and limited commitment
- Business cycle fluctuations in Mirrlees economies: the case of i.i.d. shocks
- Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
- On the benefits of currency reform
- From equals to despots: the dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information
- Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
- Default and aggregate income
- Optimal taxation with endogenously incomplete debt markets
- On the robustness of Laissez-Faire
- Efficient allocations with hidden income and hidden storage
- Money, markets, and dynamic credit
- On the production and distribution of information
- Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance
- EFFICIENCY–EQUALITY TRADE-OFF OF SOCIAL INSURANCE
- Optimal contracting with dynastic altruism: family size and per capita consumption
- A theory of political and economic cycles
- Efficient allocations in dynamic private information economies with persistent shocks: a first-order approach
- Public versus private risk sharing
- Aggregate fluctuations, interest rates, and repeated insurance under private information
- Incentives, insurance, and the variability of consumption and leisure
- Aggregate fluctuations, interest rates, and repeated insurance under private information
- Incentives, insurance, and the variability of consumption and leisure
- Payments systems design in deterministic and private information environments
- On credible monetary policy and private government information
- Computing a mechanism for a Bayesian and partially observable Markov approach
- Coexistence of money and interest-bearing bonds
- Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model
- A dynamic model of unsecured credit
- Fiscal rules and discretion under limited enforcement
- A Negishi approach to recursive contracts
- Optimal allocations in growth models with private information
- Insurance and inequality with persistent private information
- Screening for breakthroughs
- Recursive equilibrium in endogenous growth models with incomplete markets
- Innovation by entrants and incumbents
- A dynamic generalization of Becker's assortative matching result
- Optimal monetary policy with heterogeneous money holdings
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- A dynamic model of settlement
- Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design
- An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance
- Block recursive equilibria for stochastic models of search on the job
- Money and credit with limited commitment and theft
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