Spatial implementation
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Recommendations
- On the implementation of the median
- The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- Foundations of spatial preferences
- A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3186512 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Foundations of Optimization
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Nonmanipulability in two dimensions
- Note on the median of a multivariate distribution
- On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
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