A general class of adaptive strategies

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Publication:5938632

DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2746zbMath0994.91007DBLPjournals/jet/HartM01OpenAlexW1978260564WikidataQ56936138 ScholiaQ56936138MaRDI QIDQ5938632

Sergiu Hart, Andreu Mas-Colell

Publication date: 23 July 2001

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2746




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