Job market signaling and employer learning

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.01.018zbMath1247.91027OpenAlexW3023814074MaRDI QIDQ449178

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Julien Prat

Publication date: 12 September 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.018

zbMATH Keywords

signaling gamesemployer learningintuitive criterionmultiple pooling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (7)

Market signaling with grades ⋮ Informative tests in signaling environments ⋮ Signaling covertly acquired information ⋮ A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces ⋮ Testing the sender: when signaling is not enough ⋮ False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad ⋮ Test design under voluntary participation

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Market signaling with grades
• Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Trees and extensive forms
• Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition
• Belief-based refinements in signalling games
• A scent of lemon -- seller meets buyer with a noisy quality observation
• Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination
• Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model
• Dynamic Matching and Evolving Reputations
• A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable Implications
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Sequential Equilibria
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Learning and Wage Dynamics

This page was built for publication: Job market signaling and employer learning