An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.010zbMath1394.91042OpenAlexW2529400909MaRDI QIDQ516986

Philip R. Neary, Wooyoung Lim

Publication date: 16 March 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.010

zbMATH Keywords

experimentevolutionary game theorylanguage gamestochastic adjustment dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (22)

Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: equality without symmetry ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Perturbed best response dynamics in a hawk-dove game ⋮ The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes ⋮ Competing conventions with costly information acquisition ⋮ Deep and shallow thinking in the long run ⋮ Discontinuous and continuous stochastic choice and coordination in the lab ⋮ Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under probit choice ⋮ Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching ⋮ Comparison between best-response dynamics and replicator dynamics in a social-ecological model of lake eutrophication ⋮ Coordination and evolutionary dynamics: when are evolutionary models reliable? ⋮ Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems ⋮ Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule ⋮ Prospect dynamics and loss dominance ⋮ Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run ⋮ Social coordination with locally observable types ⋮ Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability ⋮ Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time ⋮ A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games ⋮ Imitation and local interactions: long run equilibrium selection ⋮ Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games ⋮ Memory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the hawk-dove game

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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