Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: the bilingual game and general supermodular games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.12.012zbMath1330.91050OpenAlexW2025987514MaRDI QIDQ894010

Satoru Takahashi, Daisuke Oyama

Publication date: 23 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.12.012

zbMATH Keywords

networkequilibrium selectionstrategic complementaritycontagionuninvadabilitybilingual game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (11)

On the relationship between \(p\)-dominance and stochastic stability in network games ⋮ Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection ⋮ Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Unstable diffusion in social networks ⋮ Dynamics of diffusion on monoplex and multiplex networks: a message-passing approach ⋮ Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under probit choice ⋮ A note on general epidemic region for infinite regular graphs ⋮ Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under logit choice ⋮ Best response dynamics on random graphs ⋮ Cost heterogeneity and the persistence of bilingualism ⋮ Large deviations and stochastic stability in population games

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