Bargaining with imperfect commitment

DOI10.1006/GAME.1998.0700zbMath1028.91506OpenAlexW2013107778MaRDI QIDQ1304008

Shinsuke Kambe

Publication date: 5 December 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/94f9cd3585c9f1197a879a347e20895757f9d8c2

zbMATH Keywords

unique equilibriumstubbornnesswar attrition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (19)

Hierarchical experimentation ⋮ One-sided games in a war of attrition ⋮ Building reputation in a war of attrition game: hawkish or dovish stance? ⋮ Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly ⋮ Bargaining and waning commitments ⋮ A reputation for honesty ⋮ Optimal policy with credibility concerns ⋮ Pledge-and-review bargaining ⋮ Commitment in alternating offers bargaining ⋮ Bargaining under almost complete information ⋮ Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining ⋮ Resource inequality in the war of attrition ⋮ Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts ⋮ Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments ⋮ Bargaining with revoking costs ⋮ No compromise: uncertain costs in reputational bargaining ⋮ A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels ⋮ The absence of attrition in a war of attrition under complete information ⋮ Audience costs and reputation in crisis bargaining

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
• Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining
• Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
• A "Reputation" Refinement without Equilibrium
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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