Bandwagon effects and long run technology choice

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0563zbMath0892.90040OpenAlexW2059921720MaRDI QIDQ1381991

Kandori Michihiro, Rafael Rob

Publication date: 1 April 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/bandwagon.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

network externalitieslong-run equilibriumbandwagon gamesglobally pairwise risk-dominant technologystochastic evolutionary approach

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites Work

• Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• p-Dominance and Belief Potential
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Unnamed Item

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