Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
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Publication:1584555
DOI10.1006/JETH.2000.2648zbMath1103.91340OpenAlexW2001848964MaRDI QIDQ1584555
Uday Rajan, Anil Arya, Jonathani Glover
Publication date: 2000
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2648
Related Items (3)
Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information ⋮ Ex post implementation ⋮ Ignorance in a multi-agent setting
Cites Work
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- Implementing action profiles when agents collude
- Virtual implementation in separable Bayesian environments using simple mechanisms
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- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Virtual Bayesian Implementation
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
- Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
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