Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
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Publication:1757552
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.11.004zbMath1419.91395OpenAlexW2900626958WikidataQ128885367 ScholiaQ128885367MaRDI QIDQ1757552
Tom Wilkening, Simon Loertscher, David Delacrétaz, Leslie M. Marx
Publication date: 15 January 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/219217
Trade models (91B60) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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