College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.05.009zbMath1419.91526OpenAlexW2133013756WikidataQ125879831 ScholiaQ125879831MaRDI QIDQ1757600

Dorothea Kübler, Morimitsu Kurino, Isa E. Hafalir, Rustamdjan Hakimov

Publication date: 15 January 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10453/130078

zbMATH Keywords

experimentincomplete informationall-pay auctionscontestscollege admissionsstudent welfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (10)

Decentralized college admissions under single application ⋮ Parallel Innovation Contests ⋮ The exam location problem: mathematical formulations and variants ⋮ Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification ⋮ Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based ⋮ Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ College assignment as a large contest ⋮ Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission ⋮ A college admissions clearinghouse

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion
• Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion
• All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
• Competing auctions with endogenous quantities
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• College assignment as a large contest
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study
• A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
• Contest architecture
• School choice: an experimental study
• Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information
• Continuum and Finite-Player Noncooperative Models of Competition
• All-Pay Contests
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
• Student Portfolios and the College Admissions Problem
• Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
• Competing auctions: Finite markets and convergence
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized