Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
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Publication:2041080
DOI10.1007/S00182-021-00758-0zbMath1468.91101OpenAlexW3132695196MaRDI QIDQ2041080
Publication date: 15 July 2021
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00758-0
Games in extensive form (91A18) Matching models (91B68) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68)
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Cites Work
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