The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation

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Publication:2186593

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.06.032zbMath1464.92182OpenAlexW2001140167WikidataQ52086652 ScholiaQ52086652MaRDI QIDQ2186593

Hannelore Brandt, Karl Sigmund

Publication date: 9 June 2020

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/7365/1/IR-04-085.pdf




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