On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model
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Publication:2205990
DOI10.1007/S00199-019-01213-8zbMath1471.91201OpenAlexW2613666268MaRDI QIDQ2205990
Publication date: 21 October 2020
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01213-8
Related Items (4)
Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains ⋮ The core for housing markets with limited externalities ⋮ Achieving the maximum size for exchange problems with dichotomous preferences ⋮ Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects
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