Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction

DOI10.1007/s00199-013-0778-7zbMath1319.91083OpenAlexW2267661888MaRDI QIDQ2256859

Helmuts Āzacis, Péter Vida

Publication date: 23 February 2015

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://carbsecon.com/wp/E2012_11.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

collusionfirst-price auction(Bayes) correlated equilibriumbid coordination mechanismbidder-optimal signal structurepublic and private signals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (5)

All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations ⋮ Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma ⋮ Optimal information exchange in contests

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