Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies

DOI10.1007/s00199-018-1142-8zbMath1432.91027OpenAlexW2646934929WikidataQ129367601 ScholiaQ129367601MaRDI QIDQ2294124

Pierpaolo Battigalli, Pietro Tebaldi

Publication date: 10 February 2020

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:igi:igierp:602

zbMATH Keywords

epistemic game theorystrong rationalizabilitystrong beliefsimple infinite dynamic game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (5)

Epistemic game theory without types structures: an application to psychological games ⋮ Two-period pricing and utilization decisions in a dual-channel service-only supply chain ⋮ Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies ⋮ Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games ⋮ Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information

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