Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf Indices Revisited

DOI10.1287/moor.26.1.89.10589zbMath1073.91512OpenAlexW2091346376MaRDI QIDQ2757671

Federico Valenciano, Annick Laruelle

Publication date: 26 November 2001

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/86822d38b5624b47afb563f68eb11d3124eae6d8

zbMATH Keywords

Power indices, voting power, collective decision-making, simple games, axiomatization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Voting theory (91B12)

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