The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility

DOI10.2307/1911680zbMath0369.90135OpenAlexW1992201685MaRDI QIDQ4146590

Alvin E. Roth

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uiuo.ark:/13960/t6qz38t6q

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Utility theory (91B16)

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