A recursive core for partition function form games
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Publication:995676
DOI10.1007/s11238-007-9030-xzbMath1161.91310OpenAlexW2102729478MaRDI QIDQ995676
Publication date: 10 September 2007
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9030-x
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- The Core of a Public Goods Economy
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