A recursive core for partition function form games

DOI10.1007/s11238-007-9030-xzbMath1161.91310OpenAlexW2102729478MaRDI QIDQ995676

László Á. Kóczy

Publication date: 10 September 2007

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9030-x

zbMATH Keywords

partition functioncoreexternalitiesoptimismpessimism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (26)

Stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games: a coincidence between myopia and farsightedness ⋮ Cooperation with externalities and uncertainty ⋮ Traffic routing oligopoly ⋮ Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities ⋮ Efficiency and stability in electrical power transmission networks: a partition function form approach ⋮ On convexity in cooperative games with externalities ⋮ Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities ⋮ The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game ⋮ The Core of Aggregative Cooperative Games with Externalities ⋮ The Nash bargaining solution in general \(n\)-person cooperative games ⋮ On the \(\gamma \)-core of asymmetric aggregative games ⋮ Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core ⋮ Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games ⋮ Consistency and the core in games with externalities ⋮ Games in sequencing situations with externalities ⋮ Cooperative oligopoly games with boundedly rational firms ⋮ The projective core of symmetric games with externalities ⋮ Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games ⋮ Strategic behavior under partial cooperation ⋮ Equivalence nucleolus for coalitional games with externalities ⋮ Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs: a partition function approach ⋮ Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities ⋮ Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities ⋮ The recursive core for non-superadditive games ⋮ Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games

Cites Work

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• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• The core of an economy with a common pool resource: a partition function form approach
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
• Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
• The Core of a Public Goods Economy

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