The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
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Publication:6168256
DOI10.1007/s00182-022-00826-zzbMath1520.91075OpenAlexW4310220349MaRDI QIDQ6168256
Mark T. Le Quement, Arnold Polanski
Publication date: 10 July 2023
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00826-z
Cites Work
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- A Theory of Credibility
- Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
- Bad Reputation
- Reputation for Quality
- Long Cheap Talk
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
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