Ambiguous implementation: the partition model

DOI10.1007/S00199-016-1023-YMaRDI QIDQ514494zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Luciano I. de Castro, Nicholas C. Yannelis, Zhi-Wei Liu

Publication date 2 March 2017

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-1023-y

zbMATH Keywords

implementationmaximin efficient allocationsmaximin equilibriummaximin preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Implementation under ambiguity
• Secure implementation in allotment economies
• Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
• Toward Natural Implementation
• Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations

Cites work

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Cited in

(14)

• Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
• On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium
• Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
• Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Robust coalitional implementation
• Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
• Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity
• A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility
• Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity
• Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility
• Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
• Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
• Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
• Optimality in an OLG model with nonsmooth preferences

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