Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility

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Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty.
Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information.
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2209547
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Individual risk and Lebesgue extension without aggregate uncertainty
Existence of Edgeworth equilibria for economies with asymmetric information
Aggregation of expert opinions
The incentive compatible coarse core when information is almost complete.
Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information.
Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty.
Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
Large strategic dynamic interactions
Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality
College assignment as a large contest
Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
Core convergence with asymmetric information
Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games
Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms
Robust perfect equilibrium in large games
The individualistic foundation of equilibrium distribution
Modeling large societies: why countable additivity is necessary
Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
A battle of informed traders and the market game foundations for rational expectations equilibrium
Mechanism design with information acquisition
Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge
Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives
Deliberative voting
Equilibria and incentives in private information economies
Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions
Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies
Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies
The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information
Dynamic yardstick mechanisms
Asset market equilibrium with short-selling and differential information
Lemons and peaches: multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil's Menu
Cooperative games with incomplete information: some open problems
Shortest path network interdiction with asymmetric information
On the closed-graph property of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in a large game: a complete characterization
Conditional exact law of large numbers and asymmetric information economies with aggregate uncertainty
On Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information
Existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency of the rational expectations equilibrium
Incentive compatibility and differentiability: new results and classic applications
On the space of players in idealized limit games
Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information
Small informational size and interim cores of large quasilinear economies
A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and expost Nash equilibrium
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2209547 (Why is no real title available?)
Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
Continuous level-k mechanism design
Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents
Bad apples in symmetric repeated games
Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies
Information requirements for mechanism design
Localized perfection
Incentive compatibility and informational requirements
Monte Carlo sampling processes and incentive compatible allocations in large economies
Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players
Information aggregation in a large multi-stage market game
Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility
Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus

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