Person:345196: Difference between revisions

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Person:345196
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m AuthorDisambiguator moved page Donald E. Campbell to Donald E. Campbell: Duplicate
 
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Latest revision as of 11:10, 11 December 2023

Available identifiers

zbMath Open campbell.donald-eMaRDI QIDQ345196

List of research outcomes





PublicationDate of PublicationType
A stability property in social choice theory2018-09-04Paper
The finer structure of resolute, neutral, and anonymous social choice correspondences2017-06-09Paper
Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences2016-12-01Paper
A characterization of simple majority rule for restricted domains2016-01-01Paper
Social choice trade-off results for conditions on triples of alternatives2015-12-22Paper
Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain2015-09-29Paper
Strategy-proofness on the Non-Paretian Subdomain2015-02-25Paper
Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization2014-09-04Paper
Two Theorems on the Range of Strategy-proof Rules on a Restricted Domain2014-08-29Paper
Breadth of loss due to manipulation2014-04-24Paper
Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda2014-04-08Paper
Relaxing IIA and the effect on individual power2013-09-20Paper
Uniformly bounded sufficient sets and quasitransitive social choice2013-02-26Paper
Social choice rules with vetoers2013-01-01Paper
There are more strategy-proof procedures than you think2012-11-08Paper
Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda2011-04-29Paper
Losses due to manipulation of social choice rules2010-11-22Paper
Strategy-proofness and weighted voting2010-09-07Paper
Gains from manipulating social choice rules2009-07-24Paper
Uniformly bounded information and social choice2009-07-01Paper
https://portal.mardi4nfdi.de/entity/Q36266802009-05-22Paper
Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives2007-11-14Paper
Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives2007-11-14Paper
Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation2006-05-18Paper
Correction to: `Information and preference aggregation'2005-12-09Paper
On the Arrow and Wilson impossibility theorems2005-10-19Paper
Non-monotonicity does not imply the no-show paradox2005-10-14Paper
Information and preference aggregation2005-09-20Paper
Incompatibility of strategy-proofness and the Condorcet principle2005-08-22Paper
A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule2003-10-16Paper
A leximin characterization of strategy-proof and non-resolute social choice procedures2003-01-26Paper
Weak independence and veto power.2002-07-24Paper
Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?2002-01-01Paper
A trade-off result for preference revelation2000-08-14Paper
A simple characterization of majority rule2000-07-09Paper
https://portal.mardi4nfdi.de/entity/Q43858551998-09-20Paper
Quasitransitive social preference: Why some very large coalitions have very little power1998-08-10Paper
Asymptotic density and social choice trade-offs1998-01-26Paper
Relaxing Pareto optimality in economic environments1997-07-23Paper
Social choice trade-offs for an arbitrary measure:1997-02-28Paper
Arrovian Social Choice Correspondences1997-02-13Paper
Independent social choice correspondences1996-12-16Paper
Continuous-valued social choice1996-01-01Paper
Nonbinary social choice for economic environments1995-09-04Paper
Arrow's Theorem for Economic Domains and Edgeworth Hyperboxes1995-09-04Paper
Lebesgue measure and social choice trade-offs1995-07-13Paper
Nondictatorially independent pairs1995-05-15Paper
A foundation for Pareto aggregation1994-12-08Paper
Arrow's choice axiom1994-07-03Paper
t or 1 - t. That is the Trade-Off1994-03-27Paper
The Arrow and Plott independence conditions1993-04-01Paper
Public goods and Arrovian social choice1993-01-16Paper
Quasitransitive intergenerational choice for economic environments1993-01-16Paper
Implementation of Social Welfare Functions1993-01-16Paper
Transitive Social Choice in Economic Environments1992-09-27Paper
Can equity be purchased at the expense of efficiency? An axiomatic inquiry1990-01-01Paper
Maximal elements of weakly continuous relations1990-01-01Paper
Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle1990-01-01Paper
Equilibrium and efficiency with property rights and local consumption externalities1989-01-01Paper
Arrow's theorem for economic environments and effective social preferences1989-01-01Paper
Wilson's theorem for economic environments and continuous social preferences1989-01-01Paper
Redistribution of wealth when knowledge is dispersed1988-01-01Paper
A Generalization of the Second Theorem of Welfare Economics for Nonconvex Economies1988-01-01Paper
Revealed social preference1987-01-01Paper
Revealed preference and demand correspondences1986-01-01Paper
Social compromise and social metrics1986-01-01Paper
Impossibility theorems and infinite horizon planning1985-01-01Paper
Enforcement of resource allocation mechanisms and second best industrial policy1984-01-01Paper
On the derivation of majority rule1982-01-01Paper
Some strategic properties of plurality and majority voting1981-01-01Paper
Anonymity conditions in social choice theory1980-01-01Paper
Algorithms for Social Choice Functions1980-01-01Paper
Manipulation of social choice rules by strategic nomination of candidates1979-01-01Paper
Rationality from a computational standpoint1978-01-01Paper
Realization of Choice Functions1978-01-01Paper
Democratic preference functions1976-01-01Paper
Voting equilibrium in a simple tax model1975-01-01Paper

Research outcomes over time

This page was built for person: Donald E. Campbell