Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.04.009zbMath1302.91038OpenAlexW2112364560MaRDI QIDQ485763

Marie Laclau

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.04.009

zbMATH Keywords

communicationnetworksrepeated gamesfolk theoremimperfect private monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks ⋮ Cooperation in partly observable networked markets ⋮ Close-knit neighborhoods: stability of cooperation in networks

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